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This paper analyzes some of the critical factors that determine project success in
the African Development Bank on the basis of data available on 146 projects
completed by 1995. The analysis relies heavily on these observed data and does
not take into account issues of project quality and implementation which have
assumed greater importance since 1995. The paper looks at the relationship between
the economic rates of return at appraisal and at completion for some 56 projects
where such data were available. First, simple ordinary least squares models are
used to explain some of the divergences in the economic rates of return at appraisal
and completion stages. This is done by regressing economic rates of return at
completion on the rates determined at appraisal. The model is then extended to
include sector dummies and time and cost overruns. An alternative specification
uses simple probit modeling techniques to assess the effect of a number of variables
on the probability of project success. The variables included in the analysis are
GDP, population size, project size (proxied by cost), time and cost overruns and
sector dummies.
The findings of the study suggest that the rates of return at appraisal are at best
weak indicators of project performance. There are invariably huge disparities between
rates of return at appraisal and those at completion, suggesting that if not qualified
the former might not be good policy guides. Further, the results suggest that a good
policy environment, as shown by rates of economic growth, inflation and the
country’s level of development, is as important for project success as are the project
specific characteristics, such as size of project or its sectoral description.RÉSUMÉ
Le présent analyse certains des facteurs essentiels qui assurent la réussite des projets
à la Banque africaine de développement en fonction des données disponibles sur
146 projets achevés à l’horizon 1995. L’analyse repose fortement sur les données
observées et ne tient pas compte des questions de la qualité et de la mise en œuvre
des projets qui ont pris plus d’ampleur depuis 1995. Le document analyse le rapport
entre les taux de rentabilité économique obtenus au moment de l’évaluation et après
l’achèvement de quelque 56 projets sur lesquels ces données étaient disponibles.
En premier lieu, de simples modèles ordinaires des moindres carrés sont utilisés
pour expliquer certaines des divergences de taux de rentabilité économique obtenus
au moment de l’évaluation et après l’achèvement du projet. Ce résultat est obtenu
par une analyse de régression des taux de rentabilité économique après l’achèvement
du projet par rapport aux taux de rentabilité économique obtenus au moment de
l’évaluation du projet. Le modèle est ensuite élargi aux variables muettes sectorielles,
au facteur temps et au dépassement des coûts. Une autre possibilité consiste à
utiliser de simples techniques d’analyse par la méthode Probit pour évaluer l’effet
d’un certain nombre de variables sur les chances de réussite d’un projet. Les
variables retenus dans l’analyse sont le PIB, la taille de la population, la taille du
projet mesurée par le coût, le facteur temps, le dépassement de coûts et les variables
muettes sectorielles.
Les conclusions de l’étude révèlent que les taux de rentabilité obtenus au moment
de l’évaluation sont, dans le meilleur des cas, des indicateurs faibles de la performance
du projet. Il y a invariablement une grande disparité entre les taux de rentabilité
obtenus au moment de l’évaluation du projet et ceux obtenus après l’achèvement
du projet suggérant que si les premiers ne sont pas assortis de réserve, peuvent ne
pas être de bons principes directeurs. En deuxième lieu, les résultats suggèrent
qu’une bonne conjoncture comme le montrent les taux de croissance économique,
le taux d’inflation et le niveau de développement du pays, est un facteur déterminant
de la réussite d’un projet tout comme les caractéristiques spécifiques d’un projet
telles que la taille du projet ou sa description sectorielle.A Statistical Analysis of Determinants of Project
Success: Examples from the African Development Bank
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Introduction
The African Development Bank (ADB) Group commenced lending operations in 1967 and had
by the end of 1999, cumulative loan and grant approvals amounting to over US$ 36 billion. The
project total summed up to 2,327 operations – 27 per cent in agriculture, 24 per cent in the multi-
sector category, including adjustment loans and stand-alone poverty alleviation projects, 17 per
cent in the transport sector, 15 per cent in industry, 9 per cent in the social sectors, mainly education
and health, and 8 per cent in public utilities. As the project portfolio has expanded, so have
demands for refined methods of appraisal (Peprah, 1994).
At least since the Second World War, project financing has been an important instrument for
transferring resources to developing countries. Projects have increased in complexity as demands
on them — sociopolitical, environmental and even cultural — expanded. Other concerns relate to
issues of design, implementation and development impact, especially with regard to the achievement
of set objectives and outputs, meeting forecast costs and time deadlines, sustainability of benefits
to the host population, and achieving acceptable economic rates of return (see ADB, 1995).
However, “project effectiveness”, increasingly the focus of multilateral institutions and national
governments, is still a difficult concept to operationalize (Polh and Mihaljek, 1992).
First, projects differ widely with regard to content, design and conditions under which they
are implemented in host countries.1 Second, while project cycle activities in multilateral institutions
are standard practice, it has been difficult to devise common evaluation methods that lend themselves
easily to the different circumstances in host countries. For instance, when political and social
pressures are accounted for, an objective ranking of performance scores across projects and
countries becomes difficult.
Third, project sustainability has generally been linked to the country’s ability to fully take
over financial and other obligations needed to sustain the operation. Normally, the poorer the
country, the harder it is for it to sustain projects for lack of adequate financial resources and
managerial and technical competence. For financing institutions, there is thus a dilemma between
the wish to eradicate poverty in the low-income countries by initiating socially conscious projects
and that of establishing sustainable projects in order to ensure the institution’s own viability (English
and Mule, 1996; Otieno, 1990).
* Statistics Division, Strategic Planning and Research Department, African Development Bank, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire.
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Macroeconomic performance in the host country is also a key determinant of project success.
Many multilateral institutions have thus increasingly combined project financing with parallel
programs directed at economic reforms, as is common in structural adjustment programs. Still,
external shocks, such as increases in energy prices, cannot always be accommodated with precision
in project design. Further, domestic and regional politics are important influences on performance,
while civil strife hinders smooth implementation and often compels donors or co-financiers to
withdraw support for projects in the affected countries. In addition, capacities of the financing
institution to plan projects, follow them up and provide technical assistance are crucial to overall
performance of the project portfolio.
In this paper we use data, on a sample of completed and evaluated projects available at the
African Development Bank and macroeconomic data on the countries where these projects have
been implemented, to assess some of the determinants of project success. We also look at the
relationship between the economic rates of return at appraisal and at completion to illustrate some
of the difficulties of operating in a relatively more challenging environment. Methodological issues
at appraisal, which could also account for any divergences, are not treated in this paper.
The Bank’s Project Analysis Process: An Overview
Project cycle activities typically include the following stages: identification, preparation and
appraisal, related to pre-implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. At the appraisal stage, a
decision is made on the suitability of a project or program for Bank financing. The appraisal
process involves evaluation of the following aspects of the project: technical feasibility, financial
and economic viability, institutional capacity, social and distributional concerns, and environmental
soundness.
An important aspect of project analysis is the estimation of the financial and economic viability
of the projects being financed by the Bank. The internal rate of return (IRR) criterion is normally
used, where applicable, to evaluate the adequacy of the potential investment. The internal rate of
return of a project is defined as the quantified opportunity cost of capital that makes the net
present value of a project equal zero. This occurs at the point where social benefits accruing to the
project equal the social costs being incurred. The internal rate of return is, therefore, the maximum
interest rate that a project could pay for the resources used, if the project is to recover its investment
and operating costs and still break even (Gittinger, 1982).
In practice, the decision rule when using the internal rate of return criterion is to consider a
project as economically viable if its rate of return is greater than the alternative rate of return — or
in the case of economic analysis, simply the opportunity cost of capital. The alternative rate of
return may include such rates of return as domestic interest rates. In a number of countries, however,
domestic interest rates are of little value in this regard since they often do not provide a good
approximation of the opportunity cost of capital.
It is important to note, however, that the internal rate of return is a relative rather than an
absolute measure of a project’s worth. Thus a project with a high capacity for income generation
and poverty reduction could still have a lower internal rate of return than, for instance, a small
highly profitable project with little impact on poverty. Furthermore, lack of a direct method for
calculating the internal rate of return implies that resort is taken to a process of trial and error, of
course facilitated by use of computer algorithms. However, since a unique internal rate of return
for a project may not be available sometimes, one cannot confidently use this criterion to rank
different projects – let alone those located in different countries.A Statistical Analysis of Project Success Determinants 3
Still, the advantage of this approach is that there is no requirement for a subjective estimation
of the opportunity cost of capital in discounting benefits and costs. Subjective inputs in the evaluation
of the projects are thus minimized. Partly for this reason, international financing institutions, including
the African Development Bank, prefer to use the internal rate of return criterion for projects
where the method is applicable.
Determinants of Performance: Project and Country Characteristics
The data used in this paper are drawn from the Operations Evaluation Department (OPEV) of the
African Development Bank2, and cover 146 projects, mainly implemented in the 1970s and 1980s,
at a total cost of over UA 10 billion3. The projects were selected on the simple criteria that they
had recorded project completion or audit reports by 1995. Of the 146 projects reviewed, only 56
had actual economic rates of return at both appraisal and completion of project works. This is
partly due to the fact that not all projects are required to be subjected to the internal rate of return
criterion. The Bank has now broadened the measures of performance to include issues relating to
implementation as well as those relating to the likelihood of achieving development objectives. On
this basis, the Bank then groups projects into three categories: successful, partially successful and
unsuccessful. In Table 1, we present aspects of project performance based on these categories as
related to project specific, country, and regional variables.
Table 1 indicates that of the 146 projects included in our sample, 28 per cent were considered
successful, 53 partially successful, while 19 per cent unsuccessful. In terms of total cost4 and size,
successful projects tended to be bigger; costing an average of UA 92.4 million, followed by
partially successful projects which averaged UA 85.8 million while the total cost of unsuccessful
projects averaged less than half this amount. With regard to estimated cost overruns, however,
successful projects cost 2.2 per cent less at completion than planned and were completed faster
than the other projects — although they still took about 50 per cent longer than planned. Partially
successful projects had average cost overruns of 9.3 per cent, but took almost twice the time
planned to get completed.5 However, unsucessful projects had relatively higher cost overruns —
twice the sample average. Similarly, time overruns were also high in the case of unsucessful projects
– although they tended to be lower, on average, than the level for partially successful projects.
Table 1: Summary of Performance by Project Indicators
Project Total Cost Cost Time
Classifications Projects (UA million)  Overrun  Overrun
%% %
Successful 28 92.4 -2.2 49
Partially Successful 53 85.8 9.3 94
Unsuccessful 19 34.0 14.0 82
Average - 70.7 7.0 75
Sample (n) = 146
Source:  Compiled by the authors from the OPEV database.4 Mubila, Lufumpa and Kayizzi-Mugerwa
Table 2 presents project performance indicators by sector. Consistent with the structure of
the African economies as well as the Bank’s general lending thrust, agricultural projects constitute
the largest proportion in the sample at 33 per cent; transport projects comprise 31 per cent, social
projects 16 per cent, while industry and multisector projects — the latter mainly in support of
adjustment programs — account for 12 and 8 per cent, respectively. However, in terms of cost
(and thus size), multisector projects in the sample accounted for close to UA 390 million each,
followed by social sector projects, mainly in education and health, at UA 136 million per project,
and industry projects at close to UA 120 million per project.
Table 2: Summary of Performance by Sector
Project Classification
Cost Cost Time Partially
Sector Projects (UA million)  Overrun Overrun Successful Successful Unsuccessful
%% %  %  %   %
Agriculture 33 24.5 12.5 97 23.6 52.6 23.8
Industry 12 117.6 3.7 17.4 78.6 1.0 20.4
Multisector 8 386.7 2.4 73 22 44 34
Social 16 136 8.8 103 17 55 28
Transport 31 17 9.7 86.5 22 69 9
Sample (n) = 146
Source:  Compiled by the authors from the OPEV database.
Though numerous, projects in agriculture and transport were relatively small, with an average
of about UA 25 million and UA 17 million, respectively. Furthermore, agriculture and transport
projects had above average cost and time overruns (see also Table 1). Cost overruns were low
for multisector and industry projects, registering 2.4 and 3.7 per cent, respectively. While industrial
projects have time overruns that are considerably below average, multisector projects took over
70 per cent longer than planned to complete. However, the worst cases of delay were recorded in
the social sector where projects in the sample took twice as long as planned to complete.
With regard to project success, the outstanding sector was industry with close to 80 per cent
of the projects considered successful. The success rate in the other sectors was quite low, with
agriculture, the multi-sector, transport and social sectors registering rates below 24 per cent. The
low rates of success in the latter sectors were compensated somewhat by rather higher rates of
partially successful projects.
In Table 3, we look at performance by size of project, with project cost at completion used
as a proxy for project size. Close to 60 per cent of the project sample are accounted for by the
two smallest size groups, with project costs of less than UA 20 million. The medium-size group,
UA 20-50 million, accounted for about 19 per cent of the project sample, and projects costing
above this amount accounted for close to 25 per cent of the sample. The information in the table
also indicates the not surprising fact that smaller projects are easier to keep within cost estimates.A Statistical Analysis of Project Success Determinants 5
Table 3: Project Performance by Size*
Cost Time Project Classification
Project Size Projects Overrun  Overrun Partially
(UA million) % % % Successful Successful Unsuccessful
(%) (%) (%)
0-10 32.8 -5 92 24 54 22
10-20 24 18.3 77 23 50 27
20-50 18.6 12 108** 23 65 12
50-100 9 6.5 62 30 54 16
100-400 12 9.2 50 40 50 10
Over 400 3.6 3 53 50 50 0
Sample (n) = 146
*   size is here proxied by the cost of the project at completion.
**  this cost group had a project with a time overrun of 1,097 per cent.
Source:  Compiled by the authors from the OPEV database.
In our sample, the smallest projects cost less at completion than had been planned. However, for
the next level of project size (UA 10-20 million), cost overruns increase dramatically, indicating a
curious discontinuity between the two groups at the lower end (in effect a doubling of cost between
the first and second groups). It is plausible to surmise that the increase in size implies increased
responsibilities of administration, monitoring and technical assistance that may make projects at
this level more complex than the smaller ones. Still, time overruns seem to decline with project
size.
Since the two smaller project categories are more common in low-income countries, the
discrepancies point to lack of capacities in these countries for managing projects of increasing
complexity. In the upper end of the size distribution, cost and time overruns are reduced — suggesting
that bigger projects ordinarily go to countries with better capacities for management. The noticeable
decline in time overruns for larger projects also suggests that bigger projects need not necessarily
imply an increase in time delays. With regard to project success, a review of the data indicates that
larger projects perform better — averaging about 40 per cent success rate compared with less
than 24 per cent for small to medium-size projects. The data could also be presented by region of
ADB operations as in Table 4. The Bank had five main operational regions during the sample
period: Central with 19 per cent of operations, East (19 per cent), North (16 per cent), South (24
per cent), and West (22 per cent). Projects in the North Region, where countries are bigger and
relatively richer, cost UA 226 million on average, while those in the West and East cost less than
half that, at UA 105 million and UA 99 million, respectively.
On average, projects in the South Region cost UA 44 million while those in the Central
Region cost UA 26 million — the smallest average cost. In terms of cost overruns, projects in the
South cost an average of 8 per cent less than planned. The West had an average cost overrun of
22 per cent, while in the East Region the level of cost overrun is about 13 per cent. With regard to
time overruns, projects in the South Region had average completion delays of some 50 per cent,
while those in other regions were delayed by over 75 per cent, reaching 90 per cent in the case of6 Mubila, Lufumpa and Kayizzi-Mugerwa
the North and West Regions. In terms of project success, the North Region showed a project
success rate of up to 64 per cent, a factor closely tied to size, with the remainder of the projects
classified as partially successful. Available information indicated no unsuccessful projects for the
North Region. Projects in the West Region, on the other hand, registered the lowest success rate
at 13 per cent – while partially successful projects in the region accounted for 61 per cent and
unsuccessful ones 26 per cent.
Table 5 provides information linking project performance to development indicators of the
host country. The rationale for the choice of economic variables is based on the premise that
prospects for project success are better in economies that have achieved macroeconomic stability,
have access to adequate foreign exchange to allow for substantial imports, have sustainable
Table 4: Summary of Project Performance by Region of Bank Operations*
Project Classification
Cost Cost Time Partially
Region Projects (UAmillion) Overrun Overrun Successful Successful Unsuccessful
 %% % % % %
Central 19 26 5.2 87 19 59 22
East 19 99 12.6 76 22 44 34
North 16 226 6.6 91 64 36 0
South 24 44 -7.8 52 33 58 9
West 22 105 22 90 13 61 26
Sample (n) = 146
*  The regions of operations equated roughly with Africa’s geographical divisions (see the ADB’s Annual Report, 1994,
for a list of the countries in each region). This division was, however, altered in 1995.
Source:  Compiled by the authors from the OPEV database.
Table 5: Project Performance by Development Indicator*
Project Export/GDP GDP Population GNP Human
Classification  Ratio Inflation Growth Size per Development
(%) (%) (%)  (Million)  capita Index
US$
Successful 24 11.7 3.9 12.4 565 0.518
Partially Successful 22 59** 3 8.8 576 0.436
Unsuccessful 17.8 19 2.6 7.5 655 0.409
Average 21.3 29.9 3.2 9.6 599 0.446
*   The macroeconomic indicators are averages for the period 1974-94, the GNP figures are for 1994.
**  Note that two of the projects considered partially successful were from a country which experienced inflation rates of
over 1,000 per cent during the period.
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics (various issues), ADB Statistical Databases, and UNDP, Human Development
Report, 1996.A Statistical Analysis of Project Success Determinants 7
population levels, and sufficient human capacities6. The Table also shows that the export/GDP
ratio, a proxy for foreign exchange availability, averaged 24 per cent for countries where successful
projects were located. Countries with partially successful projects had, on average, an export/
GDP ratio of 22 per cent, while countries with unsuccessful projects recorded a ratio of about 18
per cent. With regard to inflation, countries where successful projects were located showed relatively
low inflation of about 12 per cent, while countries with partially successful projects showed inflation
rates as high as 59 per cent. However, this high inflation level was because two of the partially
successful projects were located in a country that had undergone episodes of hyperinflation in the
1980s. With the two projects removed, average inflation for these countries falls to below 15 per
cent.
Economic growth is also shown to have a positive relationship to project success, though the
differences in growth rates between the different performance categories are not large. Regarding
the indicator of GNP per capita, there appears to be no clear-cut indication that a high GNP per
capita translates into better project performance. Successful projects were not necessarily located
in countries with the highest per capita GNP. It would seem, on the other hand, that projects do
better in countries with larger populations. Similarly, the human development index is positively
related to project performance – with successful projects being located mainly in countries with a
higher quality of life (as reflected by the index in Table 5).
Statistical Methodology and Results
There are a number of factors that could influence the post-appraisal potential of a project. Thus
the implementation of development projects is shrouded with a considerable degree of uncertainty.
This uncertainty is often indicated by the disparities between the economic rate of return at appraisal
(AERR) and that estimated at project completion (CERR).
Table 6 presents basic statistics on economic rates of return at appraisal and completion for
a total of 56 projects, for which both types of data were available. The Table shows considerable
variation and spread among the two rates. Economic rates of return at appraisal range from 6.1
per cent (for the construction of an international airport in Guinea-Bissau) to 46.8 per cent (for a
road rehabilitation project in the Central African Republic). The latter project had an economic
rate of return at completion of only 14.8 per cent – close to 70 percent off target. On the other
hand, the airport project in Guinea-Bissau had an economic rate of return at project completion of
-7.6 per cent – a shortfall of over 13 percentage points below the estimate at appraisal. Still, some
projects had exceptionally high economic rates of return at project completion, notably the water
project (in Mali) which had a CERR of 43.8 per cent (see Table 6). ) The average rate of return
of projects in the sample was 16.2 per cent at appraisal and 13.7 per cent at project completion.
Though this would indicate that project performance at completion is close to target, many projects
in the sample indicated low rates of return with overall averages boosted by a few exceptional
performers.
As pointed out earlier, it is also noteworthy that projects implemented by the Bank, on average,
take longer than planned at the appraisal stage. With regard to the 56 projects reported in Table
6, projects took almost twice as long to implement – on average 30 months later than estimated at
appraisal. On the other hand, project costs were on average 7 per cent higher than estimated at
appraisal. There is thus generally some difficult in using economic rates of return at appraisal to
predict economic rates of return at project completion.8 Mubila, Lufumpa and Kayizzi-Mugerwa
Table 6:  Summary Statistics for the 56 Projects
Indicator Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard
Deviation
Economic rate of return (%)
At appraisal (AERR) 16.2 13.9 46.8  6.1  8.9
At completion (CERR) 13.7  9.7 43.8 -7.6 11.9
Total project cost (Million UA)
At appraisal 26.6 13.6 140.9 2.3 30.3
At completion 27.3 15.6  140.9 1.94 31.0
Cost overrun (%) 7.0 0.0 186.4 -57.4 40.6
Time overrun (%) 93.7 23.0 1,097.5 -41.6 158.3
Time overrun (months) 29.7 48.8  131.7 -3.1 27.3
Source:  Compiled by the authors from the OPEV database.
On the whole, 66 per cent of the projects had rates of return at project completion which
were lower than estimated returns at appraisal. A further breakdown shows that 50 per cent of
the projects had rates of return at completion (CERR) below 10 per cent, 25 per cent had rates
below 5 per cent and 5 per cent of the projects had negative CERR. The implication of these
results is that a lot of benefits in project implementation could be obtained if the factors that lead
to project failure could be identified (Pohl and Mihaljek, 1992).
OLS Regression Results
In Figure 1, economic rates of return at appraisal (AERR) are correlated with economic rates of
return at completion (CERR) in a scatter diagram. Most of the points in the figure represented by
each project are below the 45-degree line, revealing that the CERR of most projects are lower
than the AERR. This outcome is also confirmed by the simple ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimation result in Table 7 for model 1 with a negative coefficient for the intercept and a positive
one for AERR — indicating that CERRs are, on average, lower than AERRs, even for cases
where AERRs are very low. For example, a project with an AERR of 7 per cent has a CERR of
5.9 per cent [ i.e., -0.015+(0.85*7)], and one with an AERR of 46 per cent has a CERR of 39
per cent [i.e., -0.015+(0.85*46)].
Besides the simple correlation shown in Figure 1 and Model 1, we extended the OLS model
by including cost and time overruns as explanatory variables of the level of the economic rate of
return at completion (see Model 2, Table 7). The regression results showed little correlation between
the economic rate of return at completion and the cost and time overruns. But as would be expected,
the economic rate of return at completion is strongly correlated to that at appraisal, though
magnitudes vary considerably.
The model was extended to control for sector considerations in project performance. Dummies
were introduced for projects in the agriculture, industry and transport sectors. Although the resulting
parameter estimates for the intercept and sectoral dummy variables were not significant, some
practical inferences could be drawn from these results. For instance, if we assume an average rateA Statistical Analysis of Project Success Determinants 9
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Table 7: OLS Estimates for Models Explaining Divergence in ERR
Dependent Variable : Completion Economic Rate of Return (CERR)
Explanatory Variables Regression Statistics
(OLS) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept Coefficient -0.015 -0.80 3.22
Std. Error 2.57 2.74  4.14
Appraisal Economic Coefficient 0.85 0.84 0.87
Rate of Return (AERR) Std. Error  0.14 0.14 0.14
Cost Overrun (%) Coefficient - 0.02 0.02
Std. Error - 0.03 0.03
Time Overrun (%) Coefficient - 0.05 0.26
Std. Error - 0.82 0.82
Sectoral Dummy Variable
Agriculture Coefficient - - -4.10
Std. Error - - 4.46
Industry Coefficient - - 6.69
Std. Error - - 7.63
Transport Coefficient - - -5.52
Std. Error - - 4.23
Adjusted R²  0.39 0.38 0.38
F-Statistic 37.04 12.19 12.19
S.E. of regression 9.26 9.39 9.39
No. of observations 56 56 56
Source: Authors’ calculations.10 Mubila, Lufumpa and Kayizzi-Mugerwa
of return of 15 per cent at appraisal, projects implemented in these sectors would be expected to
have a rate of return of about 13 per cent at completion [i.e. 15%*0.87]. In the agricultural sector
alone, economic rates of return at completion would be expected to average about six percentage
points below the appraisal estimate [i.e., -4.10+(15%*0.87)]. Similarly, projects in the transport
sector, would be expected to have rates of return seven percentage points below at completion of
project works [i.e. -5.52+(15%*0.87)]. Industrial projects, on the other hand, would be expected
to record completion rates of return five percentage points above the assumed average at appraisal.
Results of the Probit Analysis7
A probit model was used to assess the effect of a number of variables on the probability of project
success (see Appendix for an outline of the model). As in the tabular presentations at the beginning
we use the larger sample of 146 projects. Using the three criteria cited above: successful, partially
successful, and unsuccessful, we set all projects declared successful equal to 1 and the rest equal
to zero. This yielded 41 projects that were successful with the rest classified as not successful.
Using a probit model approach, the problem was reduced to finding the factors that influence the
probability for project success.
The explanatory variables used (see Tables 1-5) include: dummy variables for regions, with a
project in region “i” acquiring the value 1 or 0 otherwise; and dummies for the sectoral designation,
with a project acquiring value 1 if belonging to a particular sector or 0 otherwise. Other variables
relate to project specific data such as total project cost in millions of Bank Units of Account, cost
overrun in per cent and time overrun in per cent. Variables to capture the domestic economic
environment — the average growth rate of the economy as well as the size of the population –
were also included for the implementation period 1974 to 1994.
Tables 8 and 9 present results of the probit analysis. Generally, the levels of significance of
the coefficients were low, though one can still derive interesting inferences from the size of the
coefficients and the signs. First, relative to projects in the North Region8, all other regions had a
negative coefficient, indicating that there was a relatively higher probability for project success in
the North Region (although the insignificance of the coefficients precludes any firm conclusions).
Table 8: Results from the Probit Estimation of the Determinants of Project Success
Variable Coefficient T-ratio Mean of X
Constant -0.972 -1.7 -
REGC -0.21 -0.41 0.18
REGS -0.149 -0.33 0.23
REGW -0.446 -0.88 0.21
REGE -0.482 -1.13 0.18
SAG 0.24 0.69 0.26
SIND 1.4 2.82 0.1
STRAN 0.112 0.31 0.25
SSOC -0.36 -0.78 0.12
APC 0.0007 0.16 76
COR -0.009 -1.7 6.9
TOR -0.0012 -0.94 79
GDPR 0.101 1.53 3.3
POP 0.02 1.47 9.6
Source: Authors’ calculations.A Statistical Analysis of Project Success Determinants 11
















Note: The delta “∆” in front of the explanatory variables refers to a marginal change. The regression measures
 the impact of small changes in the explanatory variable on the response.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
The variables are defined as follows:
REGC  =  if the project is in the Central Region, then, REGC=1, otherwise REGC=O
REGS  =  if the project is in the South Region, then REGS=1, otherwise REGS=O
REGW  =  if the project is in the West Region, then REGW=1, otherwise REGW=O
REGE  =  if the project is in the East Region, then REGE= 1, otherwise REGE=O
SAG  =  if the project is in the agriculture sector, then SAG=1, otherwise SAG=O
SIND  =  if the project is in industry sector, then SIND=1, otherwise SIND=O
STRAN  =  if the project is in the transport sector, then STRAN=1, otherwise STRAN=O
SSOC  =  if the project is in the social sector, then SSOC=1, otherwise SSOC=O
APC  =  Project cost at completion in millions of Bank Units of Account
COR  =  Project cost overrun in per cent
TOR  =  Project time overrun in per cent
GDPR  =  Economic growth (for the periods)
POP  =  Population of the country in millions
All sector dummies, except for the social sector, are positive. Again in a relative sense this would
indicate that compared to the multi-sector projects, projects in agriculture, industry, transport
have a higher probability for success, while those in the social sector would tend to fail. Moreover,
the coefficient for the industry sector is large and highly significant. This supports what was noted
earlier that industry projects have a higher probability for success than the rest (at least in the
present sample).
Turning to project-specific data, project size, proxied by the total project cost, had a positive
sign but with an insignificant coefficient. While the positive sign on the coefficient for size may
point to the fact that large projects are less likely to fail since host governments take better care of
them – through preferential allocation of more financial and human resources. Further, large projects
often have a large number of financiers resulting in better project supervision and thus increasing
the chances for success.12 Mubila, Lufumpa and Kayizzi-Mugerwa
Cost and time overruns had negative impacts on project success, with the coefficient for the
cost-overrun variable significant at the 90 per cent level. The two proxies for the domestic
environment, economic growth and the size of the population, were both positive, at reasonably
significant levels. This would imply that growing economies sustain projects better, while relatively
large countries (at least in terms of population size) also record better project performance. Table
9 presents marginal effects, indicating the impact of minor changes in the exogenous variables. The
impacts are largely in the same direction as in Table 8. Additionally, positive changes in GDP in the
host country increase the probability for project success, as does population size. Increases in
cost and time overruns, on the other hand, lower the probability for project success.
Conclusion
The character of this paper has been exploratory in nature. Its purpose has been to attempt
to use statistical tools to analyze the factors that determine project success in the African
Development Bank on the basis of data available on projects completed by 1995. In this regard
the paper has been able to demonstrate, using relatively simple techniques that there are broad
sectoral differences in project performance. The probability for project failure rises when the
project is in the social sector, for example, while its probability for success rises when the project
is in industry. We have emphasized all along, however, that the results derived must be tentative
until a larger project sample is exposed to similar scrutiny.
The analysis has also been conducted, again for lack of data, on the assumption of an
adequately effective operation on the Bank’s side so that the probability for failure is mainly due to
exogenous factors. An extension of this study could look at the nature and quality of the project
process, by including factors related to project preparation and implementation, including the
amount of time expended by the Bank’s project officers. Issues of project quality, which have
taken on increased importance since 1995, could also be incorporated in the study. These aspects
have not featured in the present analysis for lack of data. We have also relied rather heavily on the
assumption that the macroeconomic environment has an overwhelming impact on performance.
Extending this study to include some two or three country case studies could provide more specific
details on the underlying relationship between the macroeconomic environment and project
performance. In the increasingly liberalized African economies, however, it would also seem that
micro issues such as the nature of the infrastructure would, for the most part, have more impact on
projects than issues such as foreign exchange availability.
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Appendix
1. The OLS Regression Model
1.1 The form of the OLS regression model used in this paper is as follows:
yi =ƒ( Xi; ß) + µi i  = 1,2, ….., p
where  ‘y’ is a vector of the dependent variable (CERR);
ƒ(Xi; ß) is a mathematical function of the ‘p’ explanatory (independent) variables
Xi = (xi1,…,xip); and
 ß is a vector of ‘k’ unknown parameters ß= (ß1,…ßk).
1.2 It is assumed that the various OLS assumptions are met. For details see, for
example, Abraham & Ledolter, 1983; and Afifi & Clark, 1990.
2. The Probit Model
2.1 The probit model used here assumes an underlying response variable ‘yi*’ defined
by the regression relationship:
yi*=b’xi + µi
2.2 In practice, ‘yi*’ is unobservable and what is observed is a dummy variable ‘y’ defined
by:  “y=1 if yi*>0;  y=0 if otherwise”.
2.3. The probability of a response is presented as (y=1) = p=C+(l-C)F(x’b) where ‘F’ is
the cumulative distribution function for ‘µ’; ‘x’ is a vector of independent variables; ‘p’ is the
probability of a response. For the related maximum-likelihood expression, see for example,
Maddala, 1983 and Hsiao, 1993.